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Supreme Court ruling shields corporations from 
accountability 
Lack of global justice regime burdens victims of human rights abuses 
 
February 20, 2014 10:00AM ET 
by Lauren Carasik   @LCarasik 
 
Less than a year after the United States Supreme Court ruling in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum dealt a major blow to corporate accountability for human rights 
abuses, a second decision issued last month in Daimler AG v. Bauman further 
eroded the ability of plaintiffs to sue multinational corporations in U.S. courts for 
human rights claims. 
The decision in the Kiobel case made it far more difficult for plaintiffs to file 
lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which allows foreigners to sue 
foreign defendants in U.S. courts for human rights abuses committed abroad. 
The latest ruling erects yet another structural impediment to holding corporate 
wrongdoers accountable by limiting the scope of jurisdiction against corporate 
defendants. 
Daimler v. Bauman was filed by 22 Argentine plaintiffs against the German 
corporation DaimlerChrysler (Daimler) in a federal court in California. Plaintiffs 
allege that Daimler’s subsidiary in Argentina conspired and collaborated with the 
Argentine military in the arrest, torture and murder of labor union activists 
working at its Mercedes plant during that country’s “Dirty War.” 
In order to hear cases, courts must have both personal jurisdiction over the 
parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the legal issue in dispute. Courts can 
exercise two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. General 
jurisdiction requires a finding that a defendant’s contacts with a given state are so 
extensive that a plaintiff can sue the defendant in that state for any claim, 
including activities that occurred elsewhere. Specific jurisdiction is more limited, 
allowing a plaintiff to sue in a state’s courts only when the claims arise out of the 
defendant’s conduct within that state. 
The plaintiffs in Daimler did not claim that the suit arose out of Daimler’s conduct 
in California, but rather that California could exercise general jurisdiction over 
Daimler, citing the German automaker’s extensive contacts with the state through 
its U.S. subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA). MBUSA is incorporated in 
Delaware, with its principal place of business in New Jersey. It distributes 
Daimler products in all U.S. states, including California, making it amenable to 
suit in the state. In fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2011 
upheld this general jurisdiction claim, citing MBUSA’s substantial business 
operations in California.  
‘Too big’ to stand trial 
Many observers expected the Daimler decision to clarify the standard for 
exercising jurisdiction over corporations through their subsidiaries. Instead, on 
Jan. 14, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision. The high court 
held that general jurisdiction against a foreign corporation in states other than 
where the company is incorporated or has its principal place of business applies 
only in very limited circumstances. In analyzing whether the company’s 
“continuous and systematic” contacts in the state could render it “at home,” the 
court applied a relative standard for contacts, ignoring the fact that substantial 
aggregate contacts could render a company at home in other states. A global 
company such as Daimler, whose subsidiaries operate in 40 countries and all 
U.S. states, is simply “too big” to be confined to one home state. 
In a stinging opinion concurring with the court’s decision but objecting to its 
reasoning, Justice Sonia Sotomayor called the court’s rationale a “deep 
injustice,” claiming that it in effect held Daimler to be “too big for general 
jurisdiction.”  
Sotomayor disparaged the focus of the majority’s opinion on Daimler’s 
substantial contacts with other states instead of analyzing whether its contacts 
with California were sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. In evaluating the 
corporation’s amenability to suit, Sotomayor opined that Daimler’s $4.6 billion 
annual revenue from California, although it accounted for only 2.4 percent of the 
company’s global sales, was substantial in real dollars. This revenue, combined 
with MBUSA’s multiple facilities in California, including its regional headquarters, 
could make Daimler essentially “at home” in that state. Yet the court ruled that 
subjecting Daimler to the general jurisdiction of courts in California would violate 
the “fair play and substantial justice” required by due process, despite the 
substantial benefits it derives from operating in the state. 
Economic rationale 
On closer analysis, however, the court’s reasoning was largely a matter of 
international economic policymaking. The justices held that expansive exercise of 
jurisdiction would lead to unpredictability about where corporations could be 
sued, thereby discouraging foreign investment. However, Sotomayor pointed out 
that this logic overlooks the uneven and undesirable result of placing larger 
foreign corporations at a comparative advantage over small businesses that 
cannot claim immunity from lawsuits in local courts for overseas or even 
domestic events. It also sets unjustifiably different jurisdictional standards for 
companies and individuals. While companies can escape jurisdiction even when 
they derive billions of dollars of revenue from a given state, a person can be 
“tagged” for personal jurisdiction and served legal papers as soon as she sets 
foot in the state, however brief the visit. 
The decision also curtails states’ abilities to adjudicate harms alleged against 
companies engaging in substantial business within their borders. Sotomayor 
noted that limiting the venues that can resolve disputes ultimately “shift(s) the risk 
of loss from multinational corporations to the individuals harmed by their 
actions.”   
Many corporations are already structured through a tangled and 
impenetrable web of subsidiaries that leaves plaintiffs without an 
effective remedy. 
The court also argued that the friction created by exercising jurisdiction when a 
company merely “does business” with a state could put the U.S. at odds with the 
international community. It expressed a particular concern regarding the 
European Union, where jurisdiction is generally limited to the state in which a 
company is domiciled. As outlined in an amicus brief submitted by the human 
rights organization EarthRights International, the court’s characterization of 
European law presents an inaccurate and narrow portrait of how those courts 
exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, its selective respect for international comity only 
when such principles advance American economic and geopolitical interests 
reinforces our repeated failures to adhere to international standards on human 
rights. 
After Somalia and South Sudan, the U.S. is one of only three countries that have 
not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It declines to ratify a 
number of international covenants while continually committing egregious human 
rights violations in the name of the “war on terror,” including extrajudicial and 
extraterritorial killings through the use of unmanned drones and the torture and 
indefinite detention of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba.  
Forum shopping? 
Corporate defense counsel cheered the court’s decision as an appropriate barrier 
to forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking a more favorable climate for the 
adjudication of their claims. But the decision rewards only corporations that 
become large enough to escape general jurisdiction. And it leaves human rights 
victims such as those in the Daimler case with few viable options to seek justice.  
In the Daimler case, the plaintiffs and their supporters argued that they lacked an 
alternative venue for the adjudication of their claims. Germany was not an 
appropriate forum for a number of reasons. First, German law would effectively 
bar the plaintiffs from pursuing claims by applying an already expired Argentine 
statute of limitations in its courts. Second, filing in Germany would be cost-
prohibitive for the poorly resourced plaintiffs. The country’s cost-shifting 
provisions require non-European plaintiffs to pay up front the costs the defendant 
would owe in the event their claim fails. Third, Germany’s rigid discovery 
limitations, which require plaintiffs to identify the documents they seek from 
defendants in advance, would also be an impediment to justice, as the plaintiffs 
are less likely to know exactly which documents might contain incriminating 
information. German laws also make it difficult for plaintiffs to pursue class action 
suits, a vehicle that enables individuals to pool resources. Finally, the 
impoverished Argentine plaintiffs lack alternatives to seek financial assistance to 
cover the costs of litigation in Germany.  
‘Instrument of the wealthy’ 
The court’s decision provides a road map for corporate actors to further shield 
themselves from liability. Many corporations are already structured through a 
tangled and impenetrable web of subsidiaries that leaves plaintiffs without an 
effective remedy. The decision could even make it more difficult for domestic 
plaintiffs to hold a local corporation accountable if it is sufficiently sheltered by 
corporate presence in multiple states and operating through scaffolded 
subsidiaries. 
Not surprisingly, the business community applauded the Daimler decision. But 
this case does not exist in a vacuum, and some observers are denouncing this 
evolving, aggressively pro-business jurisprudence evident in the federal judiciary. 
Last year, commenting on a study by the Minnesota Law Review that found that 
five U.S. conservative justices constituted half of the “top 10 most pro-corporate 
justices” in the last 50 years, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., criticized the 
“corporate capture of the federal courts,” calling the Supreme Court “an 
instrument of the wealthy that regularly sides with the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.”  
Deficient global governance 
The court’s willingness to restrict access to legal mechanisms in cases against 
large multinational companies occurs against the backdrop of inadequate 
mechanisms of global governance to hold corporations to account. Given the 
increasing power and economic might wielded by transnational firms, the 
international community has recognized the importance of filling this void. In 
2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, which set out detailed standards designed to 
advance transparency and accountability mechanisms for businesses. But these 
principles are largely aspirational. Last September, an Ecuadorean 
delegationimplored the council to develop “a legally binding framework to 
regulate the work of transnational corporations and to provide appropriate 
protection, justice and remedy to the victims of human rights abuses” emanating 
from transnational business transactions. 
A coalition of broad-based human rights groups, including the International 
Corporate Accountability Roundtable, are also advocating for evolving standards 
of corporate accountability. But resistance by business interests is fierce, and 
progress comes too late for many victims of human rights abuses. 
In an increasingly globalized political and economic system, the court’s ruling in 
the Daimler case only further promotes corporate interests while limiting avenues 
of redress for corporate misconduct. And while it protects well-resourced and 
omnipresent corporations, it fails to advance the foundational principles of fair 
play and substantial justice for victims of human rights abuses whose efforts to 
seek justice are thwarted by the international community’s intransigence about 
adopting enforceable global standards on corporate governance. 
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